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Abstract 
This research aims to describe the concept of transnational terrorism, relative deprivation and fundamentalism in various 
terrorism acts that occurred in Indonesia. The research method is qualitative and the type of research is explanatory that explain 
the cause of terrorism acts that influence by the global actors, fundamentalist that reject the changes and also satisfy the 
expectation in many aspects in the country from economics to the politics.  The results of this research indicate that most of the 
terrorism cases in Indonesia has various motives starting from their mission in bringing the country led by a caliphate to enforcing 
the regulations of the country based on the Islamic teachings. Viewed from the perspective of social movements, framing, and 
resource mobilization strategies seen in the rejection‟s movements of the Transnational Islamic Organization. In addition, the 
political opportunity structure in the reformation era makes the system and political structure existed became more open. It has 
provided an opportunity for Transnational Islamic Organization to conduct its movement in criticizing the government.  
 





In recent years Indonesia has known to be one of the countries that has many terrorism acts carried out by several 
terrorist groups. Young actors execute several terrorist acts in Indonesia. For example, an 18-year-old was besieging 
Marriott Hotel in Jakarta (Wernick and Von Glinow, 2012).  In 2011, a suicide bomber detonated an explosive device 
in a mosque in a police compound in Cirebon, in West Java, Indonesia. The attack occurred around 12:20 pm during 
Friday prayers. The bomber was 24 years old killed, and at least 28 people were injured, most of whom were praying 
in the mosque. The May 2018 self-destruction assailants included two adolescents, matured 16 and 18, just as two 
youthful kids, who evolved 9 and 12 in three churches in Surabaya, East Java (Andreani et al., 2012).  
Many terrorism cases are exposed and brought to court. Its victory in carrying out the arrest of terrorist actors has 
obtained appreciation from the international world. However, law enforcement has not been followed by the success 
in the de-radicalization program carried out by several government agencies. The threat of terrorism still haunts the 
community. Arrests and attacks of terrorism are still ongoing. Some of the terrorists' free detainees even returned to 
being terrorists and were caught (Ulyana and Riyansyah, 2021). 
A few of those answerable for savage fanaticism in Indonesia have been understudies/graduated class of 
instructive organizations. The writing demonstrates that Indonesian ladies (and youngsters) are progressively getting 
radicalized and joining fierce fanatic gatherings. The Jakarta-based Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) 
has hailed 'expanded action concerning ladies and expanded aim to engage in a more dynamic warrior part' for quite a 
while (Sumpter et al., 2021). An expected 45% of Southeast Asians voyaged to the ISIS-controlled region are ladies 
and youngsters who have gone with the men to battle there (this figure incorporates those joining bunches other than 
ISIS, for example, Jabhat Nusra) (Luna and Zoltan, 2015).  
Reference is too made to ladies and kids associated with late assaults completed by entire families in East Java. 
Nonetheless, except for a couple of reports zeroed in on female enlistment, the writing on savage radicalism in 
Indonesia is sexually unbiased, utilizing terms, for example, youth, understudies, graduated class, warriors, 
aggressors, jihadists, and radicals, and not recognizing guys and females. For instance, Hwang and Schulze (2018) of 
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106 Indonesians who joined assailant Islamist associations break them down by geographic area and rough fanatic 
gathering, yet not by sexual orientation. 
Several responses from the government to overcome the act of terrorism, one of the policies made us implement 
de-radicalization as the Soft Approach policy. Unfortunately, the de-radicalization program has not been optimally 
implemented, which is marked by the existence of terrorist recidivists; yet, one of the aims of de-radicalization is to 
direct perpetrators to leave perspective, view, attitude, and the act of terrorism. This paper aims to describe the 
concept of transnational terrorism, relative deprivation and fundamentalism in various terrorism acts that occurred in 
Indonesia. The hypothesis of this research is the existence of several terrorist groups in Indonesia is derived from the 
influence of terrorist groups abroad. The ease of technology and communication lead the integration to be happened 
especially in enforcing the mission of terror. Their mission is also varied among another that is why the location and 
target that they choose are different. This research is done through investigating previous research and relate to the 
current situation.  
 
2. Literature Review  
2.1 Terrorism  
Terrorism can be viewed from various scientific angles, such as sociology, criminology, politics, psychiatry, 
international relations and law. Therefore, it is difficult to formulate a definition capable of covering all aspects and 
dimensions of terrorism. Based on the United Nations Convention 1937 it says that terrorism is all forms of crime 
aimed directly at the state with the intention of creating forms of terror against certain people or groups of people or 
the wider community (Schuurman, 2020). 
Lately due to the high number of terrorisms growing urges the government to prepare the best strategy in 
overcoming the threat. The government‟s efforts in overcoming terrorism can be identified by the existence of a 
number of regulations made, one of which by ratifying Presidential Regulation Number 46 of 2010 regarding The 
National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT).  
According to the Presidential Decision Number 46 of 2010 the function of BNPT as the center of counterterrorism 
agency has several functions, including: (1) To prepare policy, strategy, and national program regarding 
counterterrorism; (2) To monitor, analyze, and evaluate counterterrorism; (3) To coordinate the implementation of 
prevention and action toward any radical ideology propaganda; and (4) To coordinate the implementation of 
deradicalization (Bahtiar and Sumari, 2017). From this article it is also known that the program implemented by 
Indonesian government is using both hard and soft approach. Inside the prison the deradicalization program include 
identification, development of counter-radicalism and monitoring and evaluation. While outside the prison it includes 
identification, rehabilitation, reeducation, resocialitation, monitoring and also evaluation (Bahtiar and Sumari, 2017). 
2.2 Transnational Terrorism 
As the research by Crenshaw (2020) mentioned,  the definition of Transnational terrorism involves actions in 
which victims, perpetrators, and sites of violence represent different states and nationalities. Local actors 
Transnational terrorist attacks may initiate against foreign targets in the geographic conflict space or radicalizing 
residents or transnational networks against targets outside the combat zone. These features of actor and location 
distinguish global terrorism from terrorism carried out by local parties within civil wars, which is not unusual. 
Transnational terrorism is essentially terrorism with an international orientation. Terrorism is when it "involves 
individuals and groups attempting to influence the political process in countries other than that of their indigenous 
origin" (Bhonsle, 2011). From the definitions above, transnational Islamic terrorism can be summarized as 
international acts of aggression by Islamic fundamentalists globally. 
Terrorism has been a concern for international politics for centuries for its ability to destabilize the internal affair 
of states and regions. The Islamic extremists increasing internationalization of terrorism has shown that terrorism is 
no longer solely an internal issue. There is an urgent need for the international community to address the challenge.  
Specifically, the growth of transnational Islamic terrorism was brought about alongside the rapid rates of 
globalization.  Since the advent of the new world order, nations states have had to share the global stage with new 
non-state actors. Globalization has helped the internationalization of terrorism in three ways. The expansion of air 
travel, the availability of televised news coverage, and the increased exchange of political interest and intersection 
around a common cause.  
In line with globalization, Pew Research Center (2011) research explained that religion as an ideology transcends 
borders and regions. Islam, for instance, is the second most popular religion with a presence in most countries of the 
world. This popularity implies that religious groups can form an alliance today and reach far more expansive than 
before.  
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Consequently, transnational terrorism has emerged to impact the core assumptions that had formed international 
politics. It has shown that threats are state-centric anymore. Still, space and boundaries are becoming increasingly 
irrelevant as anyone, geographic location vulnerable also showed that the military strength, size of a nation's high-tech 
arsenal, and geostrategic power provide little protection from the new globalized world (Sandler and Enders, 2004).  
The research conducted by Crenshaw (2020) regarding transnational terrorism mentioned that Transnational 
networks could also be arms suppliers. Again, Syria is a case in point: one reason for the resilience of the jihadist 
groups was their fighting prowess based on experience gained in Iraq and their access to weapons supplies. Non-
jihadist groups depended on them to fight Assad despite ideological quarrels.  
Like the case in Indonesia itself, some groups categorize themselves as Wahabi, Ihkwanul Muslimin (I.M.), and 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). According to Schmidt (2021), the birth of "radical Islam" can be traced to the 
emergence of Darul Islam in several cities in Indonesia. The Indonesian Muslim Shura Council (Masyumi) political 
party, which often builds transnational networks with several movements in the Middle East, is the organization that 
plays the role. The action in question is varied, such as Wahabism in Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt. Later Hizbut-Tahrir emerged from Jordan. All in all, each organization has a different color pattern of 
movement that is quite diverse, so researchers are careful in generalizing Islamism groups. In this part of the chapter, 
the researcher explains those three and relates their connection with transnational terrorism.  
a. Wahabi  
Wahhabism is a teaching that carries and has historical roots in Saudi Arabia brought by Muhammad bin 
Abdul Wahhab who Muhammad bin Saud later received as one of the tribal chiefs in the Arabian peninsula. 
After that, the teachings of Abdul Wahhab were disseminated through the power and strength of Ibn Saud's 
weapons.  
This movement entered Indonesia around 1802 at the same time as Haji Miskin, and his colleagues returned 
from performing the pilgrimage and, while living, returned to Minangkabau these people are known by the 
nickname "tiger nan salapan." Haji Miskin, with his Wahhabi school, had put pressure on the reform 
movement of Muslims in Indonesia and eventually founded a college in Bonjol and was appointed as its 
chairman Malim Basa and later known as Tuanku Imam Bonjol.  
The Wahhabi movement, often known as the Salafi movement, is based in Saudi Arabia, born and flourishing 
there since the 18th century. A unique feature of this thought is to invite to return to Islam by al-salaf al-
shalih, al-Quran , The Sunnah of the Prophet, the companions, and the teachings of the great scholars of the 
past. Observers also associate Wahhabism as a hard-line Islamic group, intolerant of other understandings of 
Islam. 
b. Ikhwanul Muslimin (I.M.)/ Muslim Brotherhood 
As for the transnational movement in Indonesia, the Muslim Brotherhood Ikhwanul Muslimin (I.M.), founded 
by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt, was present in Indonesia initially through campus da'wah institutions which later 
became the tarbiyah movement. This group then gave birth to the “Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)”,  
becoming Indonesian political parties . 
In the 1960s, a marriage between the Muslim Brotherhood and Wahhabis gave birth to hardline descendants 
worldwide. Both share ideological fanaticism, ambitions of centralized power, international orientation, and 
religious formalization.  
According to Bubalo et al. (2012), while there is no substantial evidence that Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood 
seeks to control PKS directly from Cairo, there are indications that PKS regularly participates in international 
meetings between senior Egyptian Brotherhood and representatives of Brotherhood-inspired movements and 
parties.  
The basis for this argument stems from the fact that the Ikhwan's activism, both pre-independence and post-
independence in the late 1970s, was passed through three phases: dissemination of ideas through publications, 
lectures, and academic seminars; activities of socio-religious organizations in the form of the Tarbiyah 
movement on campuses; and finally direct political activism in 1998, where the Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa 
Muslim Indonesia (KAMMI) student movement took part in the process of overthrowing Suharto (Bubalo et 
al., 2012).  
The form of the movement is similar and identical to the direction of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, 
which moved through Tarbiyah movements among educated people until it succeeded in overthrowing 
President Hosni Mubarak. However, the successor of the Muslim Brotherhood in Southeast Asia was one step 
ahead of its success in defeating the common enemy. KAMMI, with one of its figures which is quite well 
known to date, namely Fahri Hamzah, contributing to the 1998 mass action to overthrow Suharto from the 
presidency Suharto (Bubalo et al., 2012). 
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As the movement of the Muslim Brotherhood dims and stagnates, PKS shows its pragmatic maneuvers by 
turning to the superiority of the Adaley ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey. 
PKS even sent a 'study team' to Turkey in early 2008 to further investigate the strategy and reasons for the 
success of the AKP, even though contradictions exist where the AKP is reluctant to discuss and collaborate 
with other non-secular parties. Unfortunately, Turkey is unavoidable from a crisis after the attempt to 
overthrow Erdogan by the opposition. The Turkish problem has further confused one of the Islamic groups in 
Indonesia, especially PKS.  
c. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) 
Hizb ut-Tahir, which means Liberation Party in Arabic, was founded in 1953 by Taqiyuddin al-Nabhani, a 
Palestinian court judge, and has now spread to 45 countries. Hizbut -Tahir claims its movement focuses on 
the struggle to resurrect Muslims worldwide to establish an Islamic Caliphate or Islamic state. The 
organization is very active in some western countries, especially the United Kingdom and some Middle East 
and Central Asia countries. They encouraged fellow Muslims to be hostile by accusing them of following the 
thagut government, and later, they would be considered dead infidels. Not only that, they also made 
Indonesian Muslims feel worthless and guilty for not fighting to establish the caliphate (Diyani, 2019). 
The research by Diyani (2019) also mentioned that in HTI, Muslims are taught to disbelieve in the blessings 
of independence and the Establishment of the nation and state of Indonesia because it is not in the form of a 
caliphate. The most striking strategy, which is to eliminate loyalty to the state. Even more than that, 
Indonesian Muslims are invited to commit treason against their nation and country by stating that Indonesia is 
a thagut country that is not worthy of being followed and should be opposed. This has caused Indonesian 
Muslims to lose their obedience and loyalty to their government, nation and country.  
Another strategy they constantly do, discredit the government by always preaching bad things about 
governance in a democratic system. There has never been the slightest bit of good from the Indonesian 
government, nation, and state-based on democracy, and all that exists is ugliness and wickedness. Muslims 
are given the impression that living in a democracy is a priceless mistake and sin (Diyani, 2019). 
President Joko Widodo rejects HTI's campaign to enforce the caliphate. In various parts of the world until 
recently, banned the organization officially. Egypt and Turkey, as countries that became the host of the PKS 
movement as HTI's allies in Indonesia, even banned Hizb ut-Tahrir long ago. not only that, Russia and 
Germany have even decided through the courts that H.T. is a terrorist organization. Spain and France have not 
issued a firm decision, only H.T. is considered an illegal organization under strict supervision. Finally, 
Malaysia is one country that prohibits Hizbut-Tahrir from operating in their country. 
In the end, the aspirations of hardline groups in Indonesia were influenced by transnational Islam from the 
Middle East, especially those with Wahhabism or the Muslim Brotherhood or a combination of both. The 
main strategy of the Islamic transnationalism movement to make Muslims radical and violent is to form and 
support local groups as accomplices of "spreaders" and try to marginalize and destroy the more tolerant forms 
of Islamic practice that have been longer dominant in various parts of the Muslim world. 
From the three transnational movements, Wahhabis are the strongest, especially in terms of funding because 
they have abundant oil wells. However, these three global movements work hand in hand in achieving their 
goals, namely the formalization of Islam in a state and the affiliation of shari'ah as positive law and the Caliph 
Islamiyah. Wahabi sent students to study in the Middle East, who later became the proponents of Wahhabi 
ideology-Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood. With full Wahhabi-Saudi financial support, the Indonesian Islamic 
Da'wah Council established LIPIA. Most of its alumni later became agents of the Tarbiyah movement and the 
Salafi congregation in Indonesia. 
When compared with HTI, Wahhabis are indeed much closer to the Muslim Brotherhood. This closeness 
dates back to the 1950s and 1960s when Gamal Abdel Nasser dissolved the Muslim Brotherhood and banned 
all its activities in Egypt, resulting in many Muslim Brotherhood leaders fleeing and leaving their country. 
The main agenda of radical groups is to gain political power through the formalization of religion. They claim 
that Islam becomes the basis of the state, and if sharia is established as positive law, if the caliphate Islamiyah 
is affirmed, all problems will be solved. 
2.3 Relative Deprivation  
According to the definition provided by Ted Robert Gurr, Relative Deprivation is the discrepancies between what 
people want, their value expectations, and what they gain, their value accruing capabilities. Gurr states that: 'the 
intensity of relative deprivation varies enormously in terms of the average degree of perceived discrepancy between 
value expectation and value capabilities. He contends that people are more likely to revolt when they lose hope of 
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attaining their societal values. The intensity of discontent/frustration '[varies] with the severity of depression and 
inflation. 
Ethnicity, Gurr asserts, 'is the obvious basis for mobilizing oppositions' against the state. Gurr states that the higher 
the degree of frustration, the greater the political instability. In short, the intensification of R.D. about political 
participation, prosperity, collective/communal values, and societal status can lead to a decline in conceptual coherence 
leading to a breakdown in the social order and violence. It also means that the failure of the state to meet people's 
value expectations which they believe they are rightfully entitled to, can eventually lead to disorientation amongst the 
citizenry and discontentment on the part of the people towards the state. 
On the other hand, Gurr states that societal insecurity occurs when people within a specific geographically defined 
state assume that their identity is threatened. This perceived threat could be triggered and bolstered by a collective 
feeling of relative deprivation, social, economic, political, or cultural. Societal threats come in a wide variety of 
forms. Still, there are four prominent basic types: physical threats (pain, injury, death), economic threats (seizure, or 
destruction of property, denial of access to work or resources), threats to rights (imprisonment, denial of ordinary civil 
liberties), and threats to position or status (demotion, public humiliation).  
Gurr suggests that 'the existence of frustration always leads to some form of violence. He adds that 'the intensity of 
relative deprivation varies strongly with the average degree of perceived discrepancy between value expectations and 
value capabilities' The greater the gap is, the greater the intensity of the violence and hostility. Relative Deprivation 
theory refers to any perceived discrepancy between people's expectations and their capabilities to fulfill those 
expectations. This creates a gap between the deprived group and the state. Hence, Gurr suggests that 'the greater the 
intensity of deprivation, the greater the magnitude of violence.  
It can be concluded that ethnic conflict can result from ethnic diversity when ethnic groups inhabit the same 
political space but receive differential political treatment. Such tensions can lead to ethnic violence, terrorism and 
civil war, which in turn endanger national unity, poses a question of legitimacy and undermines the state's territorial 
integrity. In short, the existence of ethnically distinct groups under a single state represents a potential for societal 
insecurity and ethnic conflicts.  
While the research conducted by Dzuverovic (2013) stated that social deprivation could be happened due to 
economic inequality. This will include the natural resources, GDP growth, tax, and revenue system. Especially in this 
21
st
 century, economic inequality has started to gain a position that can cause violent conflicts. Based on Gurr‟s 
assertation, the length between the conflict of economic inequality into violent acts is at least ten years which offers 
an opportunity to establish effective prevention strategies. On the one hand, the importance of economic factors in the 
escalation of violence would decrease, while parallel to that, it would act towards conflict prevention.  
Further analyses of relative deprivation as a theory of terrorism might be wise to consider the effect of 
globalization on countries' levels of terrorism. Because relative deprivation also can be used to describe a discrepancy 
in what an individual has in economic goods and what he believes he is justly entitled to have, a look into the effect of 
increased international interactions could serve as a more practical application of the theory (Richardson, 2011).  
Last but not least, to furnish our understanding of the concept of social deprivation can be reflected from the 
research conducted by Richardson (2011), which showing us the positive correlation between higher education and 
unemployment as predictors of terrorism. This research closely examines both independent variables. As a result of 
the 56 countries taken into account, there is a positive correlation between unemployment and higher education to the 
number of terrorist attacks. However, because terrorists tend to be highly educated and come from a higher 
socioeconomic bracket, terrorism is problematic for a rational-choice model. These characteristics should greatly 
increase the opportunity cost of perpetrating a terrorist attack.  
2.4 Fundamentalism 
According to the scholar R.Scott defines fundamentalism is a reaction movement. It means that when it is applied 
to religious fundamentalism, it identifies as religious militancy to arrest the erosion of religious identity by outsiders. 
The issue of religious fundamentalism was first happened in America in 1900 when the Christian faith against the 
modernizing efforts of modernist Christians (Ahmed, 2017).  
Literature on fundamentalism identifies two triggers in particular. First, fundamentalists react to the rise of 
secularism. Fundamentalists perceive secularism as encroaching on religion and forcing it to the margins of society 
and political life, which they believe should be governed by religion. Juergensmeyer argues that secularism and 
fundamentalism (what he calls religious nationalism) are ideologies, complex systems of beliefs that aspire to shape 
political and social action. As such, secularism and fundamentalism are in direct competition with one another 
(Gregg, 2013).  
The research by Gregg (2013) notes that while some within religious groups feel secularism is threatening their 
faith, not all religious adherents are fundamentalists. The vast majority of those practicing religion do not see 
secularism as incompatible with faith and continue to live in a world with secularist and modernist ideals and 
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religious beliefs. However, for a minority, the rise of secularism is understood as a threat to the faith, and the need for 
direct action to prevent the further erosion of religion from public life.  
A second distinct trigger of fundamentalism is new interpretations and practices within a particular religious 
tradition and challenge more conservative understandings of the faith. For example, recent examples of new 
interpretations and practices within religious traditions include ordaining women as clerics and sanctioning gay 
marriage. Fundamentalist reactions to new interpretations and practices within a religious tradition aim to prevent 
what they believe to be false and destructive beliefs and practices from taking hold. This fundamentalist response 
looks more like a civil war within a tradition than a religious reaction against a more comprehensive society or a 
government's policies.  
Furthermore, this research has concluded the three different reactions from fundamentalists when responding to 
the social changes; first, fundamentalists may choose to isolate themselves from the threat. They usually make some 
physical isolation to separate themselves from society or any institutions. The second reaction is to change the 
policies or press the government for change through demonstration or other means. And the last one the 
fundamentalist may choose to use violence to push back the perceived threat either from the society or from within 
the faith (Gregg, 2013). 
Lastly, it can be concluded that the fundamentalist goals are to return their faith to what they believe as it is the 
correct state. They reject some changes that can contaminate their faith. Moreover, most fundamentalists aim to create 
clear borders that separate the true and faithful from the misguided and corrupt.  
 
3 Materials and Methods  
3.1 Materials 
The scope of this research is limited to the analysis of three theories they are transnational terrorism, relative 
deprivation and fundamentalism. Those theories will then relate to the issues of terrorist acts in Indonesia.   
3.2 Methods 
To provide a wide range of explanations on the context of three theories above, this research is using the 
qualitative research method by studying the literature. The characteristics of qualitative research are most appropriate 
for small samples and the outcomes are not measurable and quantifiable. However, this method offers a complete 
description and analysis of the research subject without limiting the scope of the research and the nature of the 
participant‟s responses (Collins and Hussey, 2003).  
To make sure the effectiveness of the qualitative research, it is important to be aware of the skills and ability of the 
researchers, while the outcomes may not be perceived as reliable because they mostly come from the researcher‟s 
judgments and interpretations. Even though it is more appropriate for small samples, it is also risky for the results of 
qualitative research to be perceived as reflecting the opinions of a wider population. The process of collecting 
qualitative data is more time consuming and less able to generalize with the researcher plays a role as the data 
gathering instrument. 
 
4 Results and Discussion 
The theories above are reflected the big picture of the terrorist behavior in Indonesia. The mushrooming cases of 
terrorism has a strong correlation with the coordination from their great leader abroad. Through the ease of 
telecommunication technology nowadays bring the smooth process of the plans. Transnational terrorism is happened 
and becoming broader especially by recruiting the members around the world.  
Not only that, the motives and reasoning of the group also varied. Most of them have their hidden agenda in 
enforcing the acts. Most of the cases happened because their expectation towards the ruling government is different 
with the reality. The only way to satisfy their ambition is by giving the terror that leads to the terrorism acts such as 
bombings in their intended places.  
Some group of people who does not like the changes or modernity also have the potential to establish the terrorist 
networks. All of them are having the same feelings of rejection towards changes in their surrounding be it the 
modernity of cultures or religion. The only effective way that they think is by demolishing the groups so that they will 
not make the changes widely. Until the peak actions is by enforcing the terrorism acts in the place where the 
community that pro with the changes exist.  
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Transnational Islamic organizations in Indonesia, especially in this study HTI, KAMMI, and IM took advantage 
of this political opportunity to declare their movements officially to the public in the reformation era. Before they 
practice the movement underground. The three organizations took advantage of the political opportunities that had 
been opened by carrying out expansion activities and movements to achieve their goals. Through various media they 
carry out activities without fear of repressive efforts from the government. So that the existence of a political 
opportunity structure has provided an opportunity for Transnational Islamic Organizations to carry out their 
movements including criticize the government.  
In addition, this study also shows that the rejection response consciously carried out by Transnational Islamic 
Organizations as a backlash strategy. Backlash arises as a result of globalization which has created new poles in the 
world. The new pole appears as a new power besides power west which is called rest. The views or thoughts brought 
by rest are in fact the opposite of west. Then the difference in views between these civilizations causes a clash or 
backlash between west and rest. 
Resources are the most important part of a social movement. All social movements need resources to be able to 
carry out their activities. Even with the opening of political opportunities, the activities of a movement will not be 
able to run if there are no resources that can be mobilized the movement. Resources can be interpreted in a broad 
sense. Resources may consist of financial strength, access to media, support from well-wishers and group loyalty. Or 
resources can also consist of ownership of space or buildings, knowledge (Stock of Knowledge), and expertise 
(skills), including values and ideologies owned by actors. However, in general, resources are anything that has utility 
value, whether owned by individuals or groups, which can be controlled, and used collectively to achieve the goals of 
the social movement (Opp, 2009). The same thing happened to the Transnational Islamic Organization movement in 
Indonesia. Although the structure and political system have provided space for Transnational Islamic Organizations to 
carry out movements in this reform era, this situation does not exist simply can be used.  
5 Conclussion 
In accordance with the statement of Benford and Snow (2000), these Transnational Islamic Organizations in their 
movement tend to position themselves as victims who experience setbacks, experience injustice so that a change is 
needed. This is what the three Transnational Islamic Organizations, relative deprivation and fundamentalism raised in 
the issue of deradicalization. The hallmark of the movement carried out by HTI is its very large concentration on 
scientific aspects and makes it the basis for the formation of the Muslim personality and Muslims. In addition, Hizb 
ut-Tahrir strives to restore faith in Islam through scientific activities on the one hand and through political channels on 
the other. Through political activities, strategy is carried out by recording and taking an inventory of all events and 
events. Then this is made into a discussion material that refers to the truth of Islamic thought and laws in order to 
achieve success time belief.  
Meanwhile, IM and KAMMI have a rationale that is closely related to the desire of some Muslims to establish an 
Islamic State (Daula Islamiyah or Islamic State). These two groups argue that Islam is actually din wa daulah 
(Religion and State), the establishment of an Islamic State is a necessity. In addition, efforts to enforce Islamic law is 
the ultimate goal of this movement. Formal enforcement of Islamic law through state institutions is the only one 
solution to overcome the problems faced by the Indonesian people in various fields. On the other hand, IM and 
KAMMI still believe that efforts to enforce Islamic law can be fought for in Indonesia by accommodating the form of 
the Republic of Indonesia. 
Then the Transnational Islamic Organization in its refusal also made a framing that the right solution for all 
problems that existed throughout the world, especially in Indonesia was to re-establish the caliphate and apply Islamic 
law in all aspects of life including in regulating the state. Re-establishing the caliphate and implementing Islamic law 
is part of the ideals of the struggle of these movements. Currently, according to them, countries with a majority 
Muslim population, including Indonesia, are not in accordance with Islamic law. Therefore, they struggle to change it 
to be in line with Islamic teachings.  
In addition, they view that the foreign policies of Western countries, which are now led by the United States, 
especially in the democratization program and human rights (HAM) campaign in its implementation have 'double 
standards' so that it gives birth to global injustice, especially to Muslims. So, from all these explanations it can be seen 
that the rejections made by Transnational Islamic Organizations at the global level have the same goal, namely to 
fight against Western hegemony against Islam. This refusal is consciously carried out using the strategies commonly 
used by a social movement, namely political opportunity structure, framing and resource mobilization.   
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